By Pat Lowinger
Wars and the study of them are never as precise as many may wish for them to be. Far too often they consist of complex series of moves and counter-moves, based upon upon incomplete intelligence, tactical acumen and political necessity. While these evaluations are rarely easy, modern military historians far too often find themselves lacking in the necessary source materials to be completely certain as to the exact nature, causation and motivations that have propelled nations to war. As important as the analysis of battles is, it is also as important, if not more so, to understand what pushes men, tribes and countries to war.
In the years prior to the decisive Roman victory at Cynoscephalae in 197 BCE an embattled Roman Republic had struggled to maintain dominance of its holdings in Italy following the ravages of Hannibal Barca. It was during this period of perceived Roman frailty that Philip V of Macedon chose (again) to exert his influence within Greece despite the provisions of the Peace of Phoenice, signed in 205 BCE. A war-weary Rome was then pushed into a decision which would alter the course of history as we now know it- would they respond to an ever-growing Macedonian threat or would they recluse themselves from Greek affairs? Reluctantly Rome resolved itself to take action in Greece. The Roman Senate would see Philip V either dead upon the field of battle or returned to within the borders of his kingdom. The necessary components of hostility had been generously contributed by both sides as well as the source of ignition. By 200 BCE the flames of the Second Macedonian War had been ignited, or perhaps it was just the rekindled embers of Roman expansion(s) into Greek affairs? Or had Philip V simply slapped the bear one too many times?
Rome Seizes Illyria
In 246 BC, a growing Roman Republic set it eyes upon controlling the Ionian Gulf and reinforced its colony at Brundisium. In effect, Brundisium had been transformed from a colony of Greek merchants into a military naval base by which the Romans could control the Ionian coast. Polybius tells us that the increased Roman presence was predicated solely upon the aggressive action of Illyrian pirates, which may have in fact been the case, but also had the strategic effect of hemming of not only Illyrian pirates, but also Epirus and Macedonia. A significant Roman naval presence created a bottleneck between the Adriatic and Ionian Seas- a bottleneck which the Romans could now exploit with relative ease.
In 231 BC the Illyrians moved militarily against their Aetolians and Epirote neighbors. The fast-moving Illyrian fleet was able to successfully raid the Greek colonies of Elis and Messenia as well as seizing the key trading port of Pheonice (an Epirote holding). The Epirotes quickly capitulated and agreed to the payment of large ransom for the return of the city. In addition, and perhaps even more significant was the formal adoption of a treaty between Illyria and Epirus against the Aetolians and Achaeans. With Epirus now an ally, the Illyrians had one less enemy to worry about. The emboldened Illyrians then quickly captured the city of Corcyra and drove off the Achaeans and their allies. This flaccid response of the Greeks towards Illyrian aggression only seemed to encourage Queen Teuta of Illyria.
As if there were not already enough chaos in the region, Rome had sent ambassadors to the court of Queen Teuta. The occupation of Pheonice by Illyrians had caused a significant disruption to Italian trade, so much so that the topic of the Illyrian’s capture of the city had come to preoccupy much of the Roman Senate’s normal dialog. In response, Rome marshaled 200 ships and a sizable land force under the command of Gnaeus Fulvius and Aulus Postumius. The Roman plan was rather direct- proceed to Corcyra and storm the city. Again, if Polybius’ account is to be regarded as authoritative, “The people of Corcyra were delighted at the arrival of the Romans, and immediately surrendered the Illyrian garrison to them by the agreement of Demetrius of Pharos.” Whether the Corcyraeans were as ecstatic at the arrival of the Romans as Polybius would have us believe, the fact remains the city was placed under the protection of the Republic- allowing further inroads by Rome into the politics and interests of Greece.
Illyrian opposition to the Roman advance largely consisted of delaying action until Illyrian troops were back within their native borders. While Illyria had been able to inflict some losses upon the Roman navy, its land forces were wholly outmatched in terms of number, equipment and training. Queen Teuta was forced to flee her capital and Gnaeus Fulvius then installed Demetrius of Pharos as ruler of the majority of Illyrian territory. The resulting peace agreement effectively divided Illyria into two regions; the first under the control of Demetrius and protection of Rome, while Teuta would retain the smaller of the two regions and be required to pay an annual indemnity. While Gnaeus Fulvius did return to Italy, Postumius was left in Illyria with 40 ships and an unknown number of infantry., Now both Macedonia and Epirus were left with a sizeable Roman army on their western and northern borders respectively.
Macedonian Intervention in Illyria
In 220 BC, Rome’s one time friend and ally, Demetrius had revived the Illyrian tradition of raiding and had moved against several Greek coastal towns, some of which were under Roman protection. The Roman response was quick and decisive and by 218 BC Demetrius had been forced to flee his native island of Pharos and seek protection in Macedonia. The tensions between Macedonia and Rome were exacerbated when Philip V formally refused to deliver Demetrius unto them under the charge of treason.
While Rome and Macedonia quibbled over the fate of Demetrius, Carthage initiated hostilities against the Republic in 218 BC. As the rest of the world watched patiently, Rome was handed a two of humiliating defeats- the first at Trebia (218 BC) then Lake Trasimene (217 BC). Seeing Roman control of the region loosening, Philip begins the construction of fleet of 100 warships with plans of restoring Demetrius to the throne of Illyria. In the summer of 216 BC, Philip sailed his navy northwards towards Apollonia, but upon viewing a small squadron of Roman warships ordered his forces to withdraw. While Philip’s force was numerically superior, as Adrian Goldsworthy correctly asserts, “These operations once again highlight the problems of gathering strategic intelligence in this period, a factor overlooked by far too many modern commentators.” Whether Philip saw the Roman ships as scouts of a much larger force or simply lost his never, historians will never know. Nevertheless, Philip’s first attempt to assert Macedonian influence in Illyria was aborted before any military action had even been taken.
The Enemy of My Enemy
Philip was forced into the realization that any military action in Illyria might overtax his own finite military resources. With Carthage having stuck the first blow, Roman influence in Greece was likely waning and at least distracted at the present. It was necessary for Philip to shift political opinion against Rome- highlighting the growing power of Rome and its continued forceful involvement in what were traditionally considered to have been Greek affairs. Philip was successful in arguing his case and able to forge a treaty with the Aetolians and their allies. What was becoming increasingly evident among the Greeks and Macedonians was whatever fate played out in the war between Rome and Carthage, the fallout would ultimately find its way to Greece. Initially Philip embraced a strategy of neutrality in regards to the increasing hostilities in the west, “his [Philip’s] first reaction was not a simple one: he was glad that war had broken out between Roman and Carthage, but still doubtful, while the resources of the two nations were as yet unknown, as to which he hoped would prove victorious.” This fear of eventual domination by a foreign power was palpable and pervasive as expressed in the words attributed to Agelaus of Naupactus;
“But if we have no hope of achieving such a degree of unity for the whole country, let me impress upon you how important it is at least for the present that we should consult one another and remain on guard, in view of the huge armies which have been mobilized, and the vast scale of the war which is now being waged in the west. For it must already be obvious to all those who pay even the slightest attention to affairs of state that whether the Carthaginians defeat the Romans or the Romans the Carthaginians, the victors will by no means be satisfied with the sovereignty of Italy and Sicily, but will come here, and will advance both their forces and their ambitions beyond the bounds of justice [Greek independence].”
Then the fateful event of August 2, 216 BC occurred. The Roman massacre at Cannae had left over 50,000 Romans dead upon the field of battle as well as their commander, Consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus. The very same person who had so successfully deposed Demetrius of Pharos two years earlier. Despite Aeglaus’ warning, Philip sent envoys to Italy with the purpose of entering into a military alliance against Rome. Hannibal on behalf of Carthage readily accepted the agreement. Despite his early restraint, Philip had put Macedonia on a collision course with Rome. Philip’s unilateral decision to come in on the side of Carthage immediately caused doubts to be raised among several of his Greek allies, in particular the Aetolians- who were inclined to see this as Philip breaking his earlier agreement(s) of neutrality (c. 1 year prior).
It wasn’t just the Aetolians who were concerned with Philip’s new alliance with Carthage, King Attalus I of Pergamon had long been an ally of Rome. Now Philip would have to contend not only with his newly disaffected allies in Greece but also those of Pergamon, a kingdom which bordered the eastern regions of Macedon via the Hellespont and Black Sea. Tactically, Philip would now potentially fighting on two fronts with Pergamon serving as a possible base of operations by which Roman forces could be brought against him. Whether Philip had considered this possibility is unclear, but he appeared resolved to again move against the Roman forces in Illyria.
Failures in Illyria and Greece
In the summer of 214 BC, Philip moved his naval forces into Illyrian waters and quickly seized Oricum, then proceeded towards Apollonia and placed the city under siege. The Roman response was predictable. From their naval base at Brundisium, Rome sent a legion under the command of Marcus Valerius Laevinus to halt any further Macedonian advances. Instead, the Romans recaptured Oricum after encountering only light resistance. The Romans were then able to break the siege at Apollonia by launching a night attack which caught the Macedonians unprepared. In panic the Macedonians fled back to their ships,. In the ensuing route, many died, while many more were captured. Most of Philip’s newly constructed fleet had to be set ablaze in order to prevent it from captured by the Romans. Philip’s only lasting and strategically significant success in Illyria was the capture of the port city of Lissus and its formidable defenses. In logistical terms, Illyria had been a bust. Without a fleet, Philip would have to scrap any future plans for the invasion of Italy if he had ever envisioned one. In addition, Laevinus’ forces did not immediately return to Brundisium, but garrisoned Oricum for the following year. With his fleet destroyed, his army in tatters, Philip was in dire need of support from his allies.
In Greece Philip’s political alliances continued to unravel. Roman envoys were successful in convincing the Aetolians that an alliance with Rome would be in their best interests- and that recent Roman successes in Italy and Syracuse marked the turning point of the war with Carthage. By by 210 BCE, Laevinus is credited with having brought not only the Aetolians, but also the Spartans into a formal alliance to resist Macedonian control in Greece. Philip was ill-prepared for a Roman-Greek alliance along his southern border. Now, with his hopes of a Macedonian resurgence unattainable, Philip withdrew his remaining forces into Thessaly.
Down, But Not Out
Having surrounded Philip on three sides, Laevinus’ appears to have regarded the situation in Greece as relatively stable. In turn, Laevinus returned to Rome, leaving the military fate of Macedonia in the hands of his Aetolian, Spartan and Pergamene allies. By 209 BCE the Aetolians and Spartans were pressing hard upon Philip’s last remaining ally- the Achaean League. In the east, King Attalus was preparing to invade from Anatolia. Philip had two choices, either to maintain a defensive posture and hope to survive a protracted campaign or move against the Aetolians and Spartans before King Attalus’ forces could arrive from Pergamon. Philip boldly chose the later and moved towards the Aetolian controlled city of Lamia.
As Philip’s army moved southwards, the Romans, Aetolians and Pergamene hastily assembled a force to block him. “The battle appears to have been two separate actions, won each time by Philip, in which the anti-Macedonian coalition lost at least a thousand men each time.” The defeated coalition then dispersed- the Aetolians returning home, while the Roman and Pergamene forces fled via the sea. Again, it was the Aetolians who had supplied the largest body of men and had correspondingly suffered the largest number of casualties. Philip, through a delegation, now approached the war-weary Aetolians and convinced them that they were being used as pawns in what amounted to a Roman-inspired conflict against Macedonia. Through his ambassador, Philip asked one simple question, why should the Aetolians do the fighting if the Romans are going to stand off at a distance, taking credit in the event of victory, but withdrawing before having to fight? The Aetolians apparently agreed and via envoys informed the Romans that they would no longer be taking the field against Macedonia. Through decisive military action and diplomacy Philip had been able to fracture the Roman coalition placed against him.
Rumors of Peace, War and Peace
As the war between the Romans and Carthaginians dragged onward into its tenth year, the effect(s) were being observed not only in Greece but among the Hellenistic kingdoms of the Mediterranean who urged Philip to agree to peace. Following a short truce, Philip moved against Pergamon which had attempted a naval landing at Chalcis- forcing those forces to withdraw. While the various trading powers of the Mediterranean pushed hard for a peaceful resolution, it was now the Aetolians who demanded concessions from Philip- concessions Philip was unwilling to give.
Roman forces in Greece seemed determined on making one last effort to bring Philip to heel. Whether this was do in part to assurances of support they had received from Pergamon and/or retaliation for Philip’s continued alliance with Carthage is unclear. What is clear is that Roman forces began raiding Macedonian coastal towns. At Elis, Philip brought the Romans to battle with this superior cavalry driving off the Romans and their allies. Philip’s forces then quickly moved and secured to fortifications at Phyricus- taking several thousand prisoners. With Roman and Pergamene forces moving by sea, Philip was forced to follow by land- this delay in speed allowed for the Romans and their allies to continue small raiding forays against Macedonia and its interests- until the Romans and Pergamene forces divided themselves. While King Attalus of Pergamon remained to sack the recently captured town of Opus, Philip moved to engage the enemy there. Catching Attalus by surprise, Philip was able to attack and drive Attalus and the Pergamene forces to their boats in order to avoid their utter destruction.
As the Pergamene forces returned home and the Romans returned to their holdings in Illyria, Philip was free to move against the Aetolians. After recapturing Oreus, and taking a few Aetolian towns into his possession Philip continued to listen to ambassadors from various Greek cities who were desirous to see the war come to an end. The Aetolians, who without the immediate support of the Roman allies, brokered their own peace with Philip in 206 BC- the war was coming to an end; it was time to make peace with the Romans. In 205 BC, both the Romans and Macedonians accepted terms and the Peace of Pheonice was signed. While the details of the agreement have been lost to history, we do know that Philip was required to formally denounce his alliance with Carthage and to affirm he would not attempt to invade Italy. What is unclear is if the Peace of Pheonice was actually a peace treaty meant to last in perpetude or was simply a temporary succession of hostilities. Rome was motivated by military necessity to have an agreeable, it not optimum resolution, with Philip who himself was inclined to see the Romans withdraw from Greece. The agreement was not only mutually beneficial, it played into the particular politics pursued by both sides. The Romans had neutralized the threat of a Macedonian-Carthaginian alliance while Philip had retained his relative influence and control of Greece.
Livy tells us that in 200 BC, “the peace with Carthage was followed by the war with Macedon. The latter conflict was in no way comparable with the Punic Wars for the gravity of the peril, either in respect to the qualities of the enemy commander, or by reason of the fighting strength of the troops engaged.” This narrative clearly shows Livy’s (and by extension Roman) bias towards Macedonia and Philip V. What is even clearer is that following the Carthaginian defeat at Zama in 202 BC, that Rome was obliged to settle old scores and repay outstanding debts.
Philip who had begun military operations in Thrace became the focus of Roman scrutiny. Despite little or no legal justification, Rome took exception with Philip’s actions. Any movement beyond Macedonia’s borders, in this case Thrace and Anatolia, were portrayed as a violation of the Peace of Pheonice, which is precisely the pretext the Romans needed to renew their war against Macedonia. Urged by their long-time ally Attalus, Rome demanded additional considerations from Philip in return for continued peace. In his own defense, Philip repeatedly asserted his adherence to the conditions agreed upon in the Peace of Pheonice– but it appears to have been to no avail. The Romans had once again interjected themselves into Greek affairs and had come down on the side of Philips strongest opponents, namely the Aetolian League, Athens, Pergamon and Rhodes. Initial Roman military actions appear to have been somewhat limited and confined themselves with a slow and progressive forcing of Philip’s military back into northern Greece. That was until the command of Roman forces in Greece was transferred to Titus Quinctius Flamininus in 198 BC.
Flamininius was aggressive in his approach and demanded that Philip withdraw all Macedonian forces into the confines of its traditional borders- in effect the Roman general was demanding that all the gains made by Philip prior to the onset of the First Macedonian War were to be surrendered. Philip appears to have repeatedly attempted to parlay with Flamininius in order to avoid a further escalation of hostilities. Philip’s ambassadors offered a more balanced resolution, one which would Macedonia honor intact. Flamininius was not moved and repeated his earlier demands. Polybius portrays Flamininius’ rejection of peace to have been inspired by potential political maneuvering designed to ensure his (re)election as Consul. While plausible, establishing a permanent Roman preeminence in Greece could also very been attractive to an ardent Hellenophile, such as Flamininius.
Cynoscephalae 197 BC
Philip’s only hope of retaining control of Thessaly and his possessions in northern Greece was to meet Flaminius and his allies in battle. The two forces met near the modern Ano Chalkiades- a small group of hills near ancient Pherae. The battle appears to have been the result of an escalating engagement of skirmishers on both sides who fought for control of the hills, followed by initial Macedonian successes against the Romans and Aetolians. Polybius attributes Philip’s defeat to the tactical inflexibility of the Macedonian Phalanx and the uneven and broken ground of the hillside. While the outcome of the battle is well-known, a rarely discussed aspect of the battle is Roman’s failure to take prisoners. As the defeated Macedonians held their pikes aloft in the traditional Hellenistic overture of surrender– the Romans proceeded to kill many of them as they attempted to surrender. Whether this was due to the Roman’s being unfamiliar with the practice as Polybius suggests, having been swept up in the heat of battle or wanting ‘payback’ for earlier defeats remains unclear. His army devastated, Philip was forced to retreat northwards. As a result Philip is forced to accept very harsh peace terms- including the payment of a war indemnity.
An Unequal War
Whether or not historians should delineate between the First and Second Macedonian Wars is debatable. One the one hand, the ratification of the Peace of Pheonice does give a temporal point of reference between the two conflicts as well as being supported by Livy’s portrayal of the ‘first’ and ‘second’ in his histories. On the other hand, modern historians lack any deep insights into the terms and provisions of the Peace of Pheonice. Was it as Philip is reported to have argued an agreement designed to protect the Macedonian sphere of influence while removing Roman involvement within Greece? If so, then Livy’s assertion that Philip’s actions in Thrace justified a second war with Macedon is highly suspect, as is the overall tone of his presentation.
The conflict between Rome and Macedonia is largely concerned with the Roman intervention in Illyria and the subsequent escalation of conflict between them- ending in a Macedonian defeat at Cynoscephalae. Philip had attempted to enlarge his own prestige and influence within Greece which he saw as not only his prerogative but also his birthright as King of Macedonia. At the same time Philip was becoming increasingly aware of Roman involvement within Greek affairs which he hoped to derail by his alliance with Carthage during the Second Punic War.
Philip was not a bad commander. F.E. Adcock describes Philip V as, “[ he was] a good strategist with a notable instinct for speed and surprise.” At times such as Lamia he was bold and daring in his actions achieving significant victories against the Aetolians and their Roman and Pergameme allies. At other times, Philip appeared indecisive at best or cowardly at worst as displayed in his actions at Apollonia. Whether it was the misfortune of bad weather or poor intelligence, Philip’s military campaigns appear to have suffered from significant share of both. But perhaps his greatest military and political mistake was the alliance he forged with Carthage against Rome. A decision which would haunt him for the remainder of his reign.
In conclusion, it was not one incident which put Rome and Macedonia on a collision course with each other. On the contrary, it was the culmination of numerous smaller events, often facilitated through proxies and allies which fueled the continued and increasing escalation of war between them. Roman, Macedonian, and Greek political goals, alliances and aspirations were highly reactionary in light of the ever-changing fortunes of war. Philip had hoped to restore the preeminence of Macedon within Greece, but Rome had already set their eyes upon it. Whether or not war is ever certitude, the Roman conquest of Greece and Macedonia appears to have been so, stalled for a time by Rome’s protracted engagement against Carthage in the Second Punic War.
Bibliography and References:
Adcock, F. E. The Greek and Macedonian Art of War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957.
Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith., and John Keegan. Roman Warfare. London: Cassell, 2000.
Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith. The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars, 265-146 BC. London: Cassell, 2003.
Matyszak, Philip. Roman Conquests: Macedonia and Greece. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2009.
Park, Michael. “The Battle of Cynoscephalae, 197 BC: The Dogs’ Head.” Ancient Warfare, 2013, 25-32.
Patavinus, Titus Livius. Rome and the Mediterranean: Books XXXI-XLV of The History of Rome from Its Foundation. Translated by Henry Bettenson. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976.
Patavinus, Titus Livius. Livy: The War with Hannibal. Translated by Aubrey Sélincourt. England: Penguin Books, 1965.
Polybius, Ian Scott-Kilvert, and Frank W. Walbank. The Rise of the Roman Empire. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982..
Sage, Michael M. Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook. London: Routledge, 1996.
 Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith., and John Keegan. Roman Warfare. (London: Cassell, 2000), 80.
 Polybius, Ian Scott-Kilvert, and Frank W. Walbank. The Rise of the Roman Empire. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 503-504.
 Ibid., 495.
 Polybius, Ian Scott-Kilvert, and Frank W. Walbank. The Rise of the Roman Empire. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 121.
 Matyszak, Philip. Roman Conquests: Macedonia and Greece. (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 21.
 Polybius, Ian Scott-Kilvert, and Frank W. Walbank. The Rise of the Roman Empire. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 120.
 Polybius, Ian Scott-Kilvert, and Frank W. Walbank. The Rise of the Roman Empire. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 118.
 Polybius gives Postiumius’ land force as consisting of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry but lacks any further description regarding the composition of those troops.
 Ibid., 121.
 Ibid., 121.
 Ibid., 122-123.
 Polybius, Ian Scott-Kilvert, and Frank W. Walbank. The Rise of the Roman Empire. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 122-123.
 While the number of Roman infantry left under Postumius command is unknown, Polybius’ account does record that Illyrian troops were recruited from the surrounding Greek and Illyrian towns.
 Matyszak, Philip. Roman Conquests: Macedonia and Greece. (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 24-27.
 Patavinus, Titus Livius. Livy: The War with Hannibal. Translated by Aubrey Sélincourt. (England: Penguin Books, 1965), 507.
Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith. The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars, 265-146 BC. (London: Cassell, 2003), 255.
 Patavinus, Titus Livius. Livy: The War with Hannibal. Translated by Aubrey Sélincourt. (England: Penguin Books, 1965), 209.
 Polybius, Ian Scott-Kilvert, and Frank W. Walbank. The Rise of the Roman Empire. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 299-300.
 Patavinus, Titus Livius. Livy: The War with Hannibal. Translated by Aubrey Sélincourt. (England: Penguin Books, 1965), 279-280.
 Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith. The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars, 265-146 BC. (London: Cassell, 2003), 256.
 Patavinus, Titus Livius. Livy: The War with Hannibal. Translated by Aubrey Sélincourt. (England: Penguin Books, 1965), 281.
 Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith. The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars, 265-146 BC. (London: Cassell, 2003), 258.
 Matyszak, Philip. Roman Conquests: Macedonia and Greece. (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 44.
 Polybius, Ian Scott-Kilvert, and Frank W. Walbank. The Rise of the Roman Empire. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 299-300.
 Matyszak, Philip. Roman Conquests: Macedonia and Greece. (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 45-46.
 Polybius’ account states that nearly 4,000 prisoners were taken following Philip’s capture of Phyricus but gives no details as to the nationalities of these men. It is possible that these figures also included those captured in the early action at Elis and were combined in Polybius’ account. In addition to prisoners, Polybius records that 20,000 animals, again of undetermined types were captured.
 Matyszak, Philip. Roman Conquests: Macedonia and Greece. (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), 48.
 Ibid., 49.
Patavinus, Titus Livius, and Henry Bettenson. Rome and the Mediterranean: Books XXXI-XLV of The History of Rome from Its Foundation. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976) , 23.
Park, Michael. “The Battle of Cynoscephalae, 197 BC: The Dogs’ Head.” (Ancient Warfare, 2013), 26.
 Sage, Michael M. Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook. (London: Routledge, 1996), 204-206.
Adcock, F. E. The Greek and Macedonian Art of War. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 72.
 Sage, Michael M. Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook. (London: Routledge, 1996), 205.
Adcock, F. E. The Greek and Macedonian Art of War. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 94.